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els of both competence and performance are critical to evaluating the ba-
sis of correlations between variations in social interaction and performance
on mental state reasoning tasks.
Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) offer a theory of the acquisition of an
understanding of mind where varieties in the structure, amount,
and types of social interaction play a pivotal role. Part of their 
argument is that other theoretical accounts underestimate, and 
indeed are inconsistent with, evidence for correlations between 
indexes of social interaction and the development of an under-
standing of mind. The authors single out theories that posit an in-
nate modular basis to the capacity to acquire a “theory of mind,”
saying that such theories “[live] uneasily with the accumulating ev-
idence, such as the sibling effect . . ., showing that the nature of
the social interaction children experience is closely related to the
development of their social understanding” (target article, sect.
2.2, para. 5).
Though common, the authors’ view misrepresents the modular
theory as claiming that “the solution to this problem of under-
standing the mind” is somehow “innately given” (sect. 2.2, para.
5). The authors even contrast the modular view with the view that
the capacity to acquire an understanding of mind is innate. But it
is precisely this latter claim that is endorsed in the modular frame-
work: “theory of mind” is described as having an innate and pos-
sibly modular basis, not as consisting in its entirety as either innate
or as a module (Leslie 2000; Scholl & Leslie 1999; 2001). The
modular view is also commonly accused – and the target article is
no exception – of being inconsistent with demonstrations that
there is “development” in the domain of understanding mind. Yet,
roles for both known developmental mechanisms, namely, matu-
ration and learning, are described in the modular theory that the
authors attack: Maturation of hardwired mechanisms enables the
child to make appropriate sense of social inputs and hence to learn
about the social and mental worlds (see German & Leslie 2000).
In a section on future research directions, the authors bemoan
the imprecision of what the term “understanding” might mean in
this domain (sect. 5, para. 6). Here we agree, and we draw their
attention to the fact that in the modular approach they reject, in-
tuitions about what should constitute having or not having “un-
derstanding” have been replaced by attempts to specify underly-
ing cognitive mechanisms, to delineate what their inputs are, to
characterize the representations they deploy, and to study how
they interact with domain-general processing mechanisms in solv-
ing “theory of mind” problems (e.g., German & Leslie 2001; Leslie
1987; 2000; Leslie & Polizzi 1998).
Throughout this same section, the authors themselves call for
research to “move from the intriguing findings relating individual
differences in the social experiences of infants and their social un-
derstanding to research that explores the processes involved”
(sect. 5, para. 4). But, despite a laudable insistence on the impor-
tance of models of process, they offer not a single proposal about
how “construction of understanding of mental states from social
interaction” is supposed to work. Instead, it is left to “future re-
search” to answer questions such as: “how . . . mothers’ tendency
to talk about their infants in psychological terms is positively as-
sociated with their child’s understanding of false beliefs almost
four years later?” (sect. 5, para. 4).
What is instructive about these gaps is that the modular frame-
work, far from “living uneasily” with the importance of social in-
put, is the only approach that has concrete proposals about how
social factors play their role. As Roth and Leslie (1998) put it, “the
emergence of [the “theory of mind” mechanism] solves a critical
but limited problem. It allows the young brain to attend to . . .
mental states despite the fact that such states cannot be seen,
heard, felt, or otherwise sensed . . . [and] being able to attend to
mental states is a prerequisite for learning about those states”
(p. 27; emphasis in original). The ability to attend to mental state
properties, such as pretending and believing, is a critical part of
what makes the social world the world it is and a critical part of
what makes experience of that world into social experience. With-
out this ability, though he or she may be constantly surrounded by
playful laughter, a child develops in social isolation; such is the lot
of the child with autism. Beyond this basic ability lies the later suc-
cess in answering questions about false beliefs. Here again, the
modular theory has made concrete proposals about how the child
learns about these social situations, learning things like “beliefs
tend to be false under systematic circumstances, surprise occurs
when a false belief is relieved, false beliefs can be induced in op-
ponents . . . [and] how to achieve the latter and get away with
it.”(Roth & Leslie 1998, p. 28).
C&L rightly remind us of the danger of “neurotic task fixation”
(sect. 4.1, para. 4; see Bloom & German 2000), and rightly ac-
knowledge that meta-analysis cannot resolve the question of
whether there is conceptual change (see Scholl & Leslie 2001).
Yet they make the very mistakes they warn against by implicitly as-
suming that “understanding” the concept of belief is just the same
thing as passing a false belief task. In particular, the authors fail to
distinguish competence and performance in their interpretation
of the false belief task, and, hence, in their interpretation of its cor-
relation with indexes of social interaction.
Positive associations between indexes of social interaction
(number of siblings, security of attachment, maternal mind-mind-
edness, parenting style, etc.) and mental state “understanding”
may be the result of many different factors in many different
mixes. Plausibly, some of these factors reflect shared genotypes,
some the structure and richness of inputs to relevant learning
mechanisms, and of course, let us not forget good old-fashioned
practice – in this case, practice with social cognizing. The studies
reviewed by the authors under this heading have invariably
demonstrated correlations with performance on a false belief task.
There is already good evidence for a strong heritable component
to false belief performance (Hughes & Cutting 1999). There is
also mounting evidence suggesting that an important, and perhaps
critical, factor in performance on false belief reflects inhibitory
processes that develop across the early years (Carlson et al. 1998).
Curiously, there is also at least one demonstration of a sibling ef-
fect on executive tasks without replication of the sibling effect on
false belief (Cole & Mitchell 2000). It is even possible that corre-
lations between various social indexes and “theory of mind” are
mediated by domain-general processes.
In conclusion, it is only by developing models of successful per-
formance on various component “theory of mind” skills, such as
recognition of agency in infancy (e.g., Johnson 2003), pretend play
(Leslie 1987; 1994), belief-desire reasoning (Leslie & Polizzi
1998), and recall of the contents of one’s own past mental states
(Barreau & Morton 1999), and by studying their specific neu-
rocognitive basis (Frith & Frith 1999; Gallagher & Frith 2003)
that we can hope to understand how the brain has been organized
to acquire this important knowledge base.
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Abstract: Individualism is not inconsistent with social interaction; it is re-
quired to explain it. Social exchanges, evidenced in gaze monitoring, so-
cial referencing, emotional responses, protodeclarative and imperative
pointing, pretence, play, and conversation all play a role in development,
but the nature of that role is opaque without an understanding of the cog-
nitive mechanisms on which they depend.
The normal child is confronted not by an intentionally inert world
of moving objects but by one of animate bodies, facial expressions,
gestures, vocalizations, and emotions. In order to cognise the
world in this way, the child does not need to possess a fully fledged
Commentary/Carpendale & Lewis: Constructing an understanding of mind
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2004) 27:1 107
intentional psychology; rather, she possesses a set of cognitive
mechanisms whose proper function is to sensitise her to possibil-
ities for intentional engagement with her surroundings. As a re-
sult of this engagement, the normal child will develop the con-
cepts of intentional psychology.
I take it Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) would agree with this char-
acterisation; however, their approach does not lead to any deeper
understanding of either the mechanisms which initially sensitise
the child to her social environment, or those which subsequently
lead to the type of conceptual understanding tested in false belief
and other “theory of mind” (TOM) tasks. There are two reasons.
First, they endorse Wittgenstein’s argument that cognitive com-
petence is mastery of a practice best understood as a skill rather
than an intellectual or theoretical achievement. Second, the au-
thors do not connect their account of social understanding to the
understanding of autism. The two issues are related.
Wittgenstein gives no explanation of the way social interaction
produces social understanding. This is because he regards it as an
essentially unanalysable skill which, once acquired, allows the sub-
ject to perceive mental states directly. His reasons for rejecting in-
tellectualist accounts of skill acquisition (fast, fluent, and flexible
responses cannot be governed by rules understood as algorithmic
reductions of theoretical inferences) combine with his conceptual
analysis of the concept of an intentional state. The folk concept,
properly analysed, of an intentional state is not that of a covert
cause of overt behaviour. Social understanding feels like immedi-
ate and non-theoretical recognition of mental states exhibited in
overt behaviour, and that is because the cognitive process involved
is a skill and not a theoretical inference (Wittgenstein 1953/1968).
This may be so, but this is no recipe for developmental psy-
chology, which is, quite rightly, concerned with the neurocogni-
tive processes involved in concept acquisition. For example, it
would not do simply to say that after a period of social interaction
certain aspects of the child’s linguistic environment (prosody,
changes in amplitude) become “criterial” for language under-
standing. Some explanatory hypothesis is required about the na-
ture of the cognitive processes implemented in developing neural
architecture. Is the child processing phonology or syntax? How is
the relevant information represented and manipulated? It seems
uninformative to say that as a result of social interaction children
acquire the ability to hear sentences as meaningful, but that is pre-
cisely what Wittgenstein said. The best way to comprehend the
process is via a metaphor “Light dawns over the whole.” But it is
simply not true that the psychological explanation of concept ac-
quisition is exhausted by analysis of its phenomenology. And it is
doubtful that the philosophical understanding is, either.
Early cognitivists reconstructed these questions as questions
about the construction and confirmation by the developing child
of theories of the linguistic domain, implemented ultimately in
neural architectures. Perhaps this is slightly over-intellectual, but
the issue of what information is relevant to cognition of a particu-
lar domain and how it is computed is still essential. Furthermore,
that is a question about what is going on in the mind of the indi-
vidual who acquires a language. Putting it this way does not ex-
clude social interaction but it allows us to say why certain aspects
of social interaction are more significant than others and why some
children rather than others develop the relevant concepts in re-
sponse to that interaction.
Without such a theory, a linguist would be forced to say that
children with, say, Specific Language Impairment (SLI ) do not
acquire language normally because their linguistic interactions are
abnormal. True, but is this because they lack acoustic or phono-
logical information? The ability to process it? Or do they lack some
form of grammatical processing? One cannot say that one is con-
cerned only with normal development, because the adequacy of a
model of normal development is evidenced by its ability to predict
and explain characteristic developmental abnormalities. Similarly
for other psychological capacities: much, if not most, of our knowl-
edge of normal function depends on abnormal cases.
The same is true of social understanding. Indeed, the TOM hy-
pothesis was originally advanced to explain the difference be-
tween normal and autistic children. Perhaps the TOM idea is
overly intellectual and perhaps (as the authors argue persuasively)
TOM is not a cognitive monolith. In that case autism is unlikely to
be a monolith either. But we are then left with the idea that there
is a multiplicity of cognitive mechanisms involved in social under-
standing that reciprocally interact in a developmental cascade in
both normal and abnormal cases. Such a view seems entirely con-
sistent with methodological individualism, which is just the at-
tempt to find out what it is about cognitive architecture that en-
ables the normally developing child, first, to become embedded
in her social world and, second, to scaffold her development us-
ing social interaction. Social exchanges, evidenced in gaze moni-
toring, social referencing, emotional responses, protodeclarative
and imperative pointing, pretence, play, and conversation, all play
a role, but the nature of that role is opaque without an under-
standing of the cognitive mechanisms on which it depends.
The rejection of methodological individualism reflects a debate
in cognitive science over the explanation of skills (of which inten-
tional understanding certainly is one). Some argue that “know-
hows,” the fundamental capacities on which skills depend, should
be identified with socially acquired dispositions. Others argue that
the acquisition of those dispositions itself depends on some fun-
damental capacities that are essentially computational and inter-
nal to the mind of the individual acquiring the skill. For almost any
skill, it turns out that its ultimate explanation is the computational
one: Think of recognising faces, catching a ball, learning a lan-
guage, or playing at dressing up. Furthermore, the phenomenol-
ogy of skill acquisition is a poor guide to the nature of those com-
putational processes. For this reason, we should be sceptical of any
account that is essentially nothing more than an elaboration of
phenomenological insights.
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Abstract: Adopting a constructivist stance is not irreconcilable with exec-
utive function accounts of emerging social understanding. The executive
function view allows for a gradual transition in theory of mind, while spec-
ifying the underlying cognitive processes that push that development for-
ward. Executive function abilities can be seen as an important interac-
tional component in the epistemic triangle.
Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) have done the field a great service in
reminding us that the development of social understanding does
not take place in a social vacuum. They point out, quite rightly,
that the question of importance should not be whether early com-
petence in social understanding exists; rather, the central focus
should be turned towards the processes that allow for the emer-
gence of social understanding. The authors propose an alternative
constructivist account that promises to bridge the current di-
chotomy that exists between those who adopt an individualistic
developmental approach versus those who subscribe to an encul-
turation view. The inclusion of Chapman’s (1991) “epistemic tri-
angle” helps to further extend Piaget’s constructivist theory to the
social realm.
Although C&L’s proposal is highly laudable, nevertheless, as
was the case with Piaget’s original account, important aspects of
the developmental process remain underspecified. That is, saying
that development is a constructive process tells us little about the
exact nature of the cognitive functions that also contribute to de-
velopment of social understanding. The authors offer coherent
objections against three prominent theories that seek to explain
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